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1. Introduction 
 
Climate change is a global challenge that must be addressed at the international level. In December 
2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted at the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) held in Paris. This is the first 
universal treaty agreed by the 195 countries in place of the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris agreement is 
aimed at keeping global temperature increases below 2 °C or, if possible, below 1.5 °C above 
pre-industrial levels. Additionally, the agreement includes reporting and revising emission goals in 
the regular meeting every five years. Before and during the Paris conference, countries were required 
to submit Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) as the individual national climate 
action plan.  
According to Japan’s INDC, the plan for global warming countermeasures was a reduction of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of 26% by fiscal year 2030 compared with fiscal year 2013 (25.4% 
compared with fiscal year 2005). Moreover, the energy mix is set as a feasible reduction target. 
Assuming an annual economic growth rate of 1.7%, the share of nuclear energy will be 20–22%, 
renewable energy 22–24%, coal energy 26%, natural gas 27%, and oil 3% by fiscal year 2030. In 
this draft, this energy mix is well balanced for achieving the reduction in CO2 emissions. However, it 
is doubtful whether this plan is feasible. 
Since the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, the energy situation in Japan has 
changed dramatically. Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the Japanese government 
reconsidered the Basic Energy Plan and shut down 55 domestic power plants on May 5, 2012. As a 
result, the dependency on oil and natural gas has risen to make up for the shortfall in nuclear power, 
and CO2 emissions have increased rapidly. While nuclear energy is a core power for realizing a 
low-carbon society, given the current serious circumstances in Japan, it is difficult to overcome the 
strong public resistance to restarting the nuclear power plants. As Figure 1 illustrates, to achieve the 
INDC policy objectives, the oil energy share is required to decrease from 44% to 3%, and the 
nuclear energy share has to increase more than 20% within 13 years, which seems unrealistic. 
The Japanese government has also implemented a carbon tax policy levied on the CO2 released 
by burning fossil fuels from April in 2016. Taxation could be an effective way of incentivizing the 
industry to reduce CO2 emissions. Specifically, the current levels of carbon tax are JPY 2040 per kL 
for crude oil and petroleum products, JPY 1080 per ton for LPG and LNG, and JPY 700 per ton for 
coal. No additional increase in the carbon tax has been planned yet, and it is currently unclear 
whether the current carbon tax is at an appropriate level or whether those policy objectives can be 
achieved. It is also questionable whether CO2 emissions can be reduced by 26% by fiscal year 2030, 
compared with the CO2 emission level in 2013. 
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Figure 1. Historical energy share and CO2 emissions, and the target for 2030. 
  
In this study, we examine the feasibility of Japan’s energy policy for reducing CO2 emissions. 
We construct a macroeconometric model linked to an energy model and apply the approach of a 
social welfare function to evaluate the existing policy. The macroeconometric model largely follows 
traditional theory by using Klein’s skeleton model (1983) and in the energy block, domestic primary 
energy prices for crude oil, natural gas, and coal are determined by energy prices in the international 
market and the exchange rate. Therefore, the domestic primary energy prices will change the 
demand for primary energies such as the composition of energy share. The linkage between the 
macroeconomic model and the energy model is made through the GDP deflator. The interaction of 
economic activity and energy demand enables CO2 emissions to be calculated. Our system can be 
used to make projections of economic variables in future periods. We then solve the optimization of 
the social welfare function in the period of the post sample, subject to the forecasted 
macroeconometric model, which links the macroeconometric model with the energy model , and we 
derive the future optimal carbon tax to achieve the policy target. The optimization is implemented 
using the optimal control approach for seeking solutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the theoretical framework 
of the social welfare function and the policy reaction function. In Section 3, we present the whole 
model. Section 4 contains the data and the empirical analysis. Finally, concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 5. 
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2. Optimal Policy  
 
In this section, we illustrate the theoretical framework of the optimal policy for Japan. 
 
2.1. Social Welfare Function 
 
Social Welfare Function and Policy Reaction Function 
In analyzing optimal policy, we begin with the statement of policy objectives, namely, the social 
welfare function (Pissarides, 1972; Friedlaender, 1973; Chow, 1975). This approach assumes that the 
policy maker implicitly specifies the policy. In general, the social welfare function is expressed in a 
quadratic loss form as 
𝐹 = 𝑤1(𝑈 − 𝑈∗)2 + 𝑤2(𝑉 − 𝑉∗)2 + 𝑤3(𝑍 − 𝑍∗)2, (1)  
where 𝑈 is the actual value of the policy target variable, 𝑈∗ is the desired value of the policy target 
variable, 𝑉 and 𝑍 are the actual values of the policy instrument, 𝑉∗and 𝑍∗ are the desired values 
of the policy instrument, and 𝑤1, 𝑤2, and 𝑤3 are weights. The social welfare function is composed 
of the actual and desired values of the target variables and policy instruments. Policy makers are 
assumed to be concerned with the difference between actual and desired values.  
Minimization (1) by policy instrument 𝑉 can derive the policy reaction function resulting from 
the decision maker’s attempt to minimize the difference between actual and desired values as 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝑉
= 2𝑤1(𝑈 − 𝑈∗)𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑉 + 2𝑤2(𝑉 − 𝑉∗) + 2𝑤3(𝑍 − 𝑍∗)𝜕𝑍𝜕𝑉 = 0, (2)  
where we suppose that the conjunctional variation between policy instruments as 𝜕𝑍 𝜕𝑉⁄  equals 
zero. Rearranging (2), the optimal policy on 𝑉 is obtained as 
𝑉 = 𝑉∗ − 𝑤1
𝑤2
(𝑈 − 𝑈∗)𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑉
. (3)  
Similarly, we obtain the optimal policy on 𝑍 as 
𝑍 = 𝑍∗ − 𝑤1
𝑤3
(𝑈 − 𝑈∗)𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑍
. (4)  
In this study, we attempt to evaluate the optimal energy policy for the Japanese carbon tax. 
Thus, Japan’s carbon tax is the policy instrument. The policy targeted values we use are based on 
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Japan’s INDC. Namely, we assume the following social welfare function as 
𝐹 = 𝑤1(𝑥 − 𝑥∗)2 + 𝑤2(𝐶𝐶2 − 𝐶𝐶2∗)2 
+𝑤3(𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜∗ )2 + 𝑤4�𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔∗ �2 + 𝑤5(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜∗ )2 
+𝑤6(𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜∗ )2 + 𝑤7�𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔 − 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔∗ �2 + 𝑤8(𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜 − 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜∗ )2, 
(5)  
where 𝑥 is the actual rate of economic growth, 𝐶𝐶2 denotes the actual level of CO2 emissions, and 
𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔, and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜 are the actual shares of energy for oil, natural gas, and coal, respectively. These 
are policy target variables. 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔, and 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜 are the rates of carbon tax for oil, natural gas, and 
coal, respectively, which are policy instruments. Asterisks represent the desired/target values of the 
variables.  
In addition, policy makers would not concentrate only on a fixed plan, irrespective of future 
change. They would determine on the basis of future prospects of the macro economy. Hence, it 
would be more realistic and relevant to evaluate the policy determination according to future 
economic observation as: 
𝐹𝑡+2 = 𝐹𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡+1 
𝐹𝑡+3 = 𝐹𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝐹𝑡+2 
⋮ 
(6)  
Therefore, we modify equation (5) and redefine the social welfare function as: 
𝐹 = 𝑤1 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)22030
𝑟=𝑡
+ 𝑤2 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)22030
𝑟=𝑡
 
+𝑤3 ��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �22030
𝑟=𝑡
+ 𝑤4 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �22030
𝑟=𝑡
+ 𝑤5 ��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �22030
𝑟=𝑡
 
+𝑤6 ��𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �22030
𝑟=𝑡
+ 𝑤7 ��𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �22030
𝑟=𝑡
+ 𝑤8 ��𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �22030
𝑟=𝑡
 
(7)  
In this study, the social welfare function of (7) is applied for simulating the optimal carbon tax. 
Specifically, we set target values of 𝑥∗ = 1.7%, 𝐶𝐶2∗ = 26% (compared with 2013), 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜∗  = 3%, 
𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔
∗  = 27%, and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜∗  = 26% for 2030, based on the target values in Japan’s INDC for the Paris 
Agreement. We use 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜∗  = 2040 yen per kL, 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔∗  = 1080 per ton, and 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜∗  = 700 per ton, which 
are constant from 2016 to 2030 based on the current Japanese carbon tax plan.  
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2.2. Policy Reaction Function 
 
Policy Reaction Function to Oil Carbon Tax 
The policy reaction function of the oil carbon tax can be obtained by differentiating (7) with respect 
to a policy instrument 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜 as 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑤1 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑥𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤2 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡  
+𝑤3 ��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤4 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡  +𝑤5 ��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤6�𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡∗ � = 0. 
(8)  
Rearranging (8), the optimal oil carbon tax is derived as 
𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡∗ − 𝑤1𝑤6 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑥𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑤2𝑤6 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡  
−
𝑤3
𝑤6
��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑤4𝑤6 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �
2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡  
−
𝑤5
𝑤6
��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 . 
(9)  
 
Policy Reaction Function to Natural Gas Carbon Tax 
The policy reaction function of the natural gas carbon tax is derived by differentiating (7) with 
respect to a policy instrument 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔.  
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 = 𝑤1 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑥𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑤2 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 
+𝑤3 ��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑤4 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 +𝑤5 ��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑤7�𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡∗ � = 0 
(10)  
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The optimal natural gas carbon tax is derived as 
𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡∗ − 𝑤1𝑤7 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑥𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑤2𝑤7 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡  
−
𝑤3
𝑤7
��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑤4𝑤7 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �
2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 
−
𝑤5
𝑤7
��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 . 
(11)  
 
 
Policy Reaction Function to Natural Gas Carbon Tax 
Similarly, we differentiate (7) with respect to a policy instrument 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜 as 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑤1 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑥𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤2 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡  
+𝑤3 ��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤4 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡  +𝑤5 ��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤8�𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡∗ � = 0. 
(12)  
Rearranging (12), we derive the policy reaction function of carbon tax of coal as 
𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡∗ − 𝑤1𝑤8 � (𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝑥𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑤2𝑤8 � (𝐶𝐶2𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑟∗)2030𝑟=𝑡 𝜕𝐶𝐶2𝑟𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡  
−
𝑤3
𝑤8
��𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑤4𝑤8 ��𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟∗ �
2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡  
−
𝑤5
𝑤8
��𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟∗ �2030
𝑟=𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑟
𝜕𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 . 
(13)  
Thus, three optimal equations of carbon tax (9) (11) and (13) are estimated. We apply the optimal 
control techniques in order to solve the framework of social welfare function/policy reaction 
function. The optimal carbon tax is derived subject to the macroeconometric model linked to an 
energy model. While theses policy reaction function intends time lags from initial year to 2030, we 
focus on two time lags in empirical analysis. 
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3. Model Structure  
 
 
Our model mainly follows Yano and Kosaka (2001) and Kosaka (2015). The structure of our model 
consists of a macroeconometric block and an energy block. The macroeconometric main block is 
based on the Klein’s skeleton model (1983), which is presented in Appendix. A.  
The energy block is explained in this section. The energy block illustrates the mechanism of 
determining the final energy consumption and generating CO2 emissions.  
 
Determination of Final/Primary Energy Demand 
The primary energy consumption of fossil fuel (crude oil, natural gas, and coal) increases CO2 
emissions. The regulation of the reduction of CO2 emissions constrains economic development. 
We assume a two-level constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function with 
capital, labor, and final energy as inputs. Two-level CES production is specified as 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴�𝛼1𝐿𝑡𝛽1 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝐻𝑡𝛽1� 1𝛽1 (14)  
𝐻𝑡 = �𝛼2𝐾𝑡𝛽2 + (1 − 𝛼2)𝐸𝐹,𝑡𝛽2� 1𝛽2 , (15)  
where 𝐴 is the total efficiency parameter of production, 𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, and 𝐸𝐹,𝑡 are the labor, capital 
stock, and final consumption of energy, respectively, 𝛼1, and 𝛼2 are the distribution parameters, 
and 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denote the elasticity of substitution. 0 < 𝛼1,𝛼2 < 1 and 𝛽1,𝛽2 < 1. By solving 
the cost minimization, we obtain 
𝐸𝐹,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
= �𝑃𝐾,𝑡
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 �1 − 𝛼2𝛼2 �� 11−𝛽2 , (16)  
where 𝑃𝐾,𝑡 is the capital price and 𝑃𝐹,𝑡 is the final energy price. This equation determines the final 
energy consumption.  
There is a large loss in converting from primary energy to final energy. To consider this, we 
specify the primary energy supply, 𝐸1,𝑡, as 
𝐸1,𝑡 = 𝑓𝐸�𝐸𝐹,𝑡�. (17)  
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Determination of Composition of Primary Energy 
The primary energy supply can be defined by the summation of each primary energy demand as 
𝐸1,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑜𝑡ℎ,𝑡 , (18)  
where 𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡, 𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡, 𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡, 𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑐,𝑡, and 𝐷𝑜𝑡ℎ,𝑡 are the final energy consumptions of crude oil, 
natural gas, coal, nuclear, and other energy sources like geothermal heat and renewable energy, 
respectively.  
The distributions of primary energy are determined by the share of the four types of energy sources.  
𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐸1,𝑡 (19)  
𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝐸1,𝑡 (20)  
𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐸1,𝑡 (21)  
𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐,𝑡𝐸1,𝑡 (22)  
Here, 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 , 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡, 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 , and 𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐,𝑡 are the share of crude oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear, 
respectively. The other energy is expressed as the remaining amount 
𝐷𝑜𝑡ℎ,𝑡 = �1 − 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐,𝑡�𝐸1,𝑡, (23)  
where 𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ,𝑡 is the share of other energy sources including geothermal heat and renewal energy. 
Because the energy demand varies substitutionally as relative energy prices change, the share of 
energy is determined by the mechanism 
ln 𝑠𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑓 �ln 𝑠𝑜,𝑡−1 , ln�𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑜,𝑡𝑃𝑜,𝑡 ��, 
𝑖 = 𝑜𝑖𝑜,𝑔𝑔𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑜 : 𝑗,𝑘, 𝑜 ≠ 𝑖 (24)  
where 𝑃𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 is the domestic end-use oil price, 𝑃𝐸𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 is the domestic end-use natural gas price, 
and 𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 is the domestic end-use price.  
 
Determination of CO2 Emissions  
The CO2 emissions can be calculated by the carbon emission factor for fossil fuel energy sources as 
𝐶𝐶2𝑡 = 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 , (25)  
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where 𝐶𝐶2𝑡 is CO2 emissions, and 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡, 𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡, and 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 are the CO2 emission factors of oil, 
natural gas, and coal, respectively. In this study, we assume 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 2.8641, 𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 = 2.0675, and 
𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 3.7620.2 
 
Determination of Domestic Primal Energy Price  
The domestic primary energy prices are assumed to respond to international energy prices and the 
exchange rate. The determination of domestic primary energy prices can be defined as 
𝑃𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑜�𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑒𝑡� (26)  
𝑃𝐸𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑔�𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑒𝑡� (27)  
𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑐�𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑒𝑡�, (28)  
where 𝑒𝑡 is the exchange rate and 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡, 𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 , and 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡  are the international prices in US 
dollars of crude oil, natural gas, and coal, respectively. In particular, we assume that 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 is the 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) world crude oil spot price. Then, as for natural gas price, we use the 
Henry Hub natural gas spot price. Thus, 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 , 𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 , and 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡  are determined by the 
international market.  
The primary energy price can be defined by the average of the individual primary energy prices 
with share weights of 
𝑃1,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 . (29)  
The primary energy price is related to the final energy price as 
𝑃𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑓�𝑃1,𝑡�. (30)  
 
Carbon Tax 
Carbon taxes incentivize reducing CO2 emissions. In Japan, carbon taxes are added to fossil fuels 
according to the level of CO2 emissions. Thus, the domestic primary energy price is written as 
𝑃𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑜�𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑒𝑡� + 𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 (31)  
                                                   
2 We refer to the Energy and Economic Statistics Survey 2013 (in Japanese) published by the Energy 
Data and Modeling Center in Japan. 
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𝑃𝐸𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑔�𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑒𝑡�+ 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 (32)  
𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑐�𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑒𝑡� + 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡. (33)  
The Japanese government introduced a carbon tax for reducing CO2 emissions of JPY 2040 per kL 
for crude oil and petroleum products; 1080 per ton for LPG and LNG JPY; and JPY 700 per ton for 
coal.  
 
Decomposition of CO2 Emissions  
The CO2 emissions are decomposed as 
𝐶𝐶2𝑡 = �𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑐𝑜2𝑡 � �𝐸1,𝑡𝐸𝐹,𝑡� �𝐸𝐹,𝑡𝑋𝑡 � �𝑋𝑡𝑁𝑡�𝑁𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 � 1𝑒1,𝑡� �𝑒𝐹,𝑡�𝑋�𝑡𝑁𝑡, (34)  
where 𝜅𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶2𝑡 𝐸1,𝑡⁄  is CO2 emissions per unit total primary energy supply, 𝐶𝐶2𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶2𝑡 𝑁𝑡⁄  is 
the rate of CO2 emissions per capita, 𝑒1,𝑡 = 𝐸𝐹,𝑡 𝐸1,𝑡⁄  is the energy conversion efficiency, 
𝑒𝐹,𝑡 = 𝐸𝐹,𝑡 𝑋𝑅𝑡⁄  is the energy intensity, and 𝑋�𝑡 = 𝑋𝑅𝑡 𝑁𝑡⁄  is the total output per capita.  
 
 
4. Simulation Analysis  
 
4.1. Data 
We employ several data sources to investigate how the level of Japanese carbon tax might be set in 
order to reach the targeted CO2 emission. We mainly use the annual National Accounts Statistics 
published by the OECD National Accounts Statistics Database from 1990 to 2013 for constructing a 
Japanese macroeconometric model. The capital stock data are based on the System of National 
Accounts (SNA) by Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. The related primary energy data rely on 
the Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). The data for demand of primary energy as 
crude oil, natural gas, and coal are based on the volume of import data published by UN Comtrade. 
Prices of primary energy are calculated by dividing trade values in current dollar values by volume 
of trade. Final energy consumption data of each energy source is from Energy Balances of OECD 
Countries published by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Final energy prices of oil, natural 
gas, and coal are incorporated from the IEA’s oil information, natural gas information, and coal 
information, respectively.  
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4.2. Estimation Results and Final Test 
 
Estimated Results 
We estimate the stochastic equations of the macroeconometric model and the energy model in a 
sample period from 1990 to 2013, applying ordinary least squares. The several estimation results are 
shown in Appendix B.  
 
Final Test  
In total, our system consists of 37 simultaneous equations, comprising 19 estimated equations and 18 
definitional identities. We conducted the final test from 1990 to 2013 (annual). Table 1 shows the 
root mean square error (RMSE). Some endogenous variables might not be satisfactory. In particular, 
prices appear slightly unstable. However, the overall performance of this system is acceptable. 
 
== Table 1 == 
 
4.3. Baseline Simulation  
We run the system in the post-sample period from 2014 to 2030 (annual). We are required to make 
the data for the exogenous variables in the post-sample in advance. Some variables are created along 
with their trends, whereas the others are set at a constant value at the end of sample 2013.  
The policy instruments in this study correspond to carbon taxes for oil, natural gas, and coal. 
According to climate change policies by the Japanese government, there are no plans to increase the 
tax rate. Thus, we use a constant value from 2016 to 2030. This baseline is used for calculating the 
optimal carbon tax from 2014 to 2020 of JPY 2,040 per kL for crude oil and petroleum products, 
1080 per ton for LPG and LNG JPY, and JPY 700 per ton coal.  
 
4.4. Scenario Simulation of Optimal Carbon Tax 
In general, the policy reaction function coefficients of equations (9), (11), and (13) are estimated by 
regression based on the econometrics. However, this study takes the reverse approach. By assigning 
values to those weights in post-sample (from 2014 to 2030), we identify the policy reaction function 
and yield the optimal level of carbon tax (𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡, 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡, and 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡).  
Each explanatory variable has different units and scales. Thus, all weights are standardized so 
that the targeted carbon tax values (𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡∗ , 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡∗ , and 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡∗ ) are equal to 1. An optimal carbon tax 
(𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡, 𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡, and 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑜,𝑡) above 1 implies that the carbon tax should be increased to achieve the 
policy goals. However, an optimal carbon tax under 1 means that it is possible to decrease the carbon 
tax. We attempt to examine how the optimal carbon tax rate changes depending on policy weights 
based on the following four scenarios. 
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Scenario 1: All weights are equivalently significant.  
As a basic case, this scenario supposes that individual policy objectives of economic growth, CO2 
emissions, and the energy mix are equally important to implement. All weights of the policy reaction 
function are set in 1. Specifically, equation (9) contains 𝑤1 𝑤6⁄ = 1, 𝑤2 𝑤6⁄ = 1, 𝑤3 𝑤6⁄ = 1, 
𝑤4 𝑤6⁄ = 1, and 𝑤5 𝑤6⁄ = 1, and similar methods are applied to equations (11) and (13). 
Table 2 shows the optimal carbon tax levels for Scenario 1. All values are above 1, which 
suggests that the current level of carbon tax is too low to complete the target value. When converted 
into a price, the results show that the optimal oil carbon tax should be raised from the current level of 
2,040 JP yen to 3,495 JP Yen, the natural gas carbon tax should be raised from 1,080 to 1,963 JP Yen, 
and the coal carbon tax should be raised from 700 to 1,633 JP Yen in 2030. 
 
== Table 2 == 
 
Scenario 2: The weight attached to economic growth is most significant. 
Assuming that the annual economic growth of 1.17 is the first priority among the targets, we 
give 𝑤1 𝑤6⁄ = 10 in equation (9), 𝑤1 𝑤7⁄ = 10 in equation (11), and 𝑤1 𝑤8⁄ = 10 in equation 
(13). All other weights, namely CO2 emissions, and the energy mix of oil, natural gas, and coal, 
remain equal to 1. Table 3 presents the results for Scenario 2. The values in parentheses denote the 
rate of divergence from the values of Scenario 1. Overall, when the priority is economic growth, the 
simulated values show that the carbon tax levels could be decreased slightly. 
 
== Table 3 == 
 
Scenario 3: The weight attached to the rate of CO2 emissions is most significant. 
Scenario 3 implies that the priority of the policy is to realize the desired rate of CO2 emissions 
reduction. Specifically, we give 𝑤2 𝑤6⁄ = 2 in equation (9), 𝑤2 𝑤7⁄ = 2 in equation (11), and 
𝑤2 𝑤8⁄ = 2 in equation (13). All other weights , namely economic growth, and the energy mix of oil, 
natural gas, and coal, are equal to 1. As Table 4 shows, the current tax rate is too low to achieve the 
policy objective of the CO2 emissions reduction. The optimal carbon tax levels should be increased 
as follows: oil carbon tax raised 2.43 times, natural gas raised 2.64 times, and coal raised 3.67 times. 
In terms of price, the oil carbon tax should be raised from the current tax of 2,040 JP Yen to 4,951 JP 
Yen, natural gas from 1,080 JP Yen to 2,846 JP Yen, and coal from 700 JP Yen to 2,566 JP Yen.  
 
== Table 4 == 
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Scenario 4: The share of the energy mix is emphasized. 
We examine three scenarios that alter the weights of oil, natural gas, and coal. Table 5 shows the 
results of this scenario in which the weight of the oil share of energy is changed. The results show 
that the optimal oil carbon tax should be increased, whereas natural gas and coal as alternative 
energy sources can be decreased slightly. Tables 6 and 7 show the results of optimal oil carbon taxes 
with changes made to the weights of the natural gas and coal, respectively. These results suggest that 
the carbon tax of the corresponding energy tends to increase; whereas, the carbon tax of alternative 
energy sources can decrease slightly. 
 
== Table 5 == 
 
== Table 6 == 
 
== Table 7 == 
 
Scenario 5: This scenario assigns different levels of importance to the policy objects.  
We consider that the policy objects have different priorities and thus assign different weights as 
follows: CO2 emission weight = 2.5, oil share = 30, and natural gas = 10. Table 8 presents the results. 
To realize the targets, oil carbon tax should be raised 2.78 times, natural gas 3.04 times, and coal 
4.31 times. In monetary terms, oil tax should be raised to 5,681 JP Yen (from 2,040 JP Yen), natural 
gas to 3,287 JP Yen (from 1,080 JP Yen), and coal to 3,020 JP Yen (from 700 JP Yen).  
 
== Table 8 == 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This study constructed a macroeconometric model linked to an energy model for Japan. By 
implementing optimal control in our system, we forecasted the future optimal carbon tax rate from 
2016 to 2030. The findings are summarized as follows. 
 
1. It will be difficult to achieve the target reduction of CO2 emissions, energy mix share, and 
economic growth at the current carbon tax level. The simulation results show that the carbon tax 
needs to be at least doubled. 
2. In particular, the reduction of CO2 emissions compared with 2013 among policy targets would 
be hardest to achieve. Occasionally, the government will be asked to review this policy 
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objective.  
3. It will be difficult to realize an annual economic growth rate of 1.7%. Furthermore, if it assumes 
that the rate of economic growth is more than 1.7%, due to tight tradeoff between economic 
growth and reduction of CO2 emissions, the carbon tax would be required to decrease.   
 
The simulated results show that the INDC’s policy objectives are not feasible at the current carbon 
tax levels. To achieve these goals, carbon taxes should be increased significantly as soon as possible. 
However, carbon taxes are just one climate policy instrument available to governments to reduce 
CO2 emissions; other policies to establish a low cost society include adopting electric vehicles or 
promoting renewable energies. 
While our system analyzed the optimal energy policy for Japan and examined the feasibility of 
the policy targets, the system requires some improvements. First, the international energy price (WTI 
oil price and Henry Hub natural gas price) should be endogenized in this model. The variation of 
world energy prices affects the domestic energy price, which affects the demand/supply of energy 
and consequently the macro economy. Our system should be extended to link to the world energy 
model, which describes the international market of crude oil and natural gas. Second, the domestic 
macroeconometric model should be expanded to an international macroeconometric model to 
include other countries. The reduction of CO2 emissions is a global problem that requires 
international cooperation, and this interdependence should be described. These improvements will 
be implemented in future studies.   
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Table 1. Evaluation of Model Performance by RMSE (Selected Variables) 
Variables RMSE 
Consumption (real) 0.00    
GDP (real) 0.00  
Capital (real) 0.00  
Capital Price 0.00  
Energy Intensity 0.00  
Share of demand for Coal 0.01  
Share of demand for Natural Gas 0.01  
Share of demand for Crude Oil 0.02  
GDP deflator 0.02  
Consumption of Primary Energy 0.02  
CO2 emission per unit total primary energy supply 0.05  
Consumption of Primary Energy: Natural Gas 4.23  
Consumption of Primary Energy: Coal 4.83  
Consumption of Primary Energy: Crude Oil 11.08  
Supply/Demand of Final Energy 14.74  
Demand of Primary Energy 21.79  
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Table 2. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels for Scenario 1 
Year Oil Natural Gas Coal 
2016 1.182  1.098  1.196  
2017 1.255  1.144  1.281  
2018 1.316  1.192  1.373  
2019 1.371  1.242  1.464  
2020 1.422  1.296  1.553  
2021 1.467  1.351  1.640  
2022 1.509  1.407  1.726  
2023 1.548  1.465  1.811  
2024 1.584  1.523  1.896  
2025 1.618  1.583  1.980  
2026 1.649  1.643  2.063  
2027 1.680  1.703  2.146  
2028 1.709  1.765  2.229  
2029 1.742  1.804  2.300  
2030 1.713  1.818  2.333  
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Table 3. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels for Scenario 2 
Year Oil  Natural Gas  Coal  
2016 1.180   (-0.01%) 1.10  (-0.03%) 1.200   (-0.01%) 
2017 1.250   (-0.01%) 1.14  (-0.03%) 1.280   (-0.01%) 
2018 1.320   (-0.01%) 1.19  (-0.03%) 1.370   (-0.01%) 
2019 1.370   (-0.01%) 1.24  (-0.03%) 1.460   (-0.01%) 
2020 1.420   (-0.01%) 1.30  (-0.02%) 1.550   (-0.01%) 
2021 1.470   (-0.01%) 1.35  (-0.02%) 1.640   (-0.01%) 
2022 1.510   (-0.01%) 1.41  (-0.02%) 1.730   (-0.01%) 
2023 1.550   (-0.01%) 1.46  (-0.02%) 1.810   (0.00%) 
2024 1.580   (-0.01%) 1.52  (-0.02%) 1.900  (0.00%) 
2025 1.620   (-0.01%) 1.58  (-0.02%) 1.980   (0.00%) 
2026 1.650   (0.00%) 1.64  (-0.02%) 2.060   (0.00%) 
2027 1.680   (0.00%) 1.70  (-0.02%) 2.150   (0.00%) 
2028 1.710   (0.00%) 1.76  (-0.02%) 2.230   (0.00%) 
2029 1.740   (0.00%) 1.80  (-0.02%) 2.300   (0.00%) 
2030 1.710   (0.00%) 1.82  (-0.02%) 2.330   (0.00%) 
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Table 4. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels for Scenario 3 
Year Oil  Natural Gas  Coal  
2016 1.36  (15.42%) 1.20  (8.97%) 1.39  (16.36%) 
2017 1.51  (20.33%) 1.29  (12.60%) 1.56  (21.96%) 
2018 1.63  (24.04%) 1.38  (16.09%) 1.75  (27.19%) 
2019 1.74  (27.10%) 1.48  (19.51%) 1.93  (31.69%) 
2020 1.84  (29.68%) 1.59  (22.82%) 2.11  (35.60%) 
2021 1.94  (31.87%) 1.70  (25.96%) 2.28  (39.03%) 
2022 2.02  (33.77%) 1.81  (28.94%) 2.45  (42.08%) 
2023 2.10  (35.42%) 1.93  (31.73%) 2.62  (44.81%) 
2024 2.17  (36.89%) 2.05  (34.36%) 2.79  (47.26%) 
2025 2.24  (38.21%) 2.17  (36.82%) 2.96  (49.50%) 
2026 2.30  (39.40%) 2.29  (39.13%) 3.13  (51.54%) 
2027 2.36  (40.49%) 2.41  (41.30%) 3.29  (53.41%) 
2028 2.42  (41.49%) 2.53  (43.34%) 3.46  (55.15%) 
2029 2.48  (42.62%) 2.61  (44.58%) 3.60  (56.53%) 
2030 2.43  (41.65%) 2.64  (44.99%) 3.67  (57.15%) 
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Table 5. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels: Case of Oil Share in Scenario 4 
Year Oil  Natural Gas  Coal  
2016 1.18   (0.02%) 1.10   (-0.03%) 1.19   (-0.06%) 
2017 1.26   (0.03%) 1.14   (-0.03%) 1.28   (-0.07%) 
2018 1.32   (0.03%) 1.19   (-0.04%) 1.37   (-0.08%) 
2019 1.37   (0.04%) 1.24   (-0.04%) 1.46   (-0.09%) 
2020 1.42   (0.04%) 1.29   (-0.04%) 1.55   (-0.10%) 
2021 1.47   (0.04%) 1.35   (-0.04%) 1.64   (-0.10%) 
2022 1.51   (0.05%) 1.41   (-0.04%) 1.72   (-0.11%) 
2023 1.55   (0.05%) 1.46   (-0.04%) 1.81   (-0.11%) 
2024 1.58   (0.06%) 1.52   (-0.05%) 1.89   (-0.12%) 
2025 1.62   (0.06%) 1.58   (-0.05%) 1.98   (-0.12%) 
2026 1.65   (0.06%) 1.64   (-0.05%) 2.06   (-0.13%) 
2027 1.68   (0.07%) 1.70   (-0.05%) 2.14   (-0.13%) 
2028 1.71   (0.07%) 1.76   (-0.05%) 2.23   (-0.14%) 
2029 1.74   (0.07%) 1.80   (-0.05%) 2.30   (-0.14%) 
2030 1.71   (0.07%) 1.82   (-0.05%) 2.33   (-0.14%) 
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Table 6. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels: Case of Natural Gas Share in Scenario 4 
Year Oil  Natural Gas  Coal  
2016 1.18   (-0.01%) 1.10   (0.01%) 1.20   (-0.01%) 
2017 1.25   (-0.01%) 1.14   (0.01%) 1.28   (-0.02%) 
2018 1.32   (-0.01%) 1.19   (0.01%) 1.37   (-0.02%) 
2019 1.37   (-0.01%) 1.24   (0.01%) 1.46   (-0.02%) 
2020 1.42   (-0.01%) 1.30   (0.01%) 1.55   (-0.02%) 
2021 1.47   (-0.01%) 1.35   (0.01%) 1.64   (-0.02%) 
2022 1.51   (-0.01%) 1.41   (0.01%) 1.73   (-0.02%) 
2023 1.55   (-0.01%) 1.46   (0.01%) 1.81   (-0.03%) 
2024 1.58   (-0.01%) 1.52   (0.01%) 1.90   (-0.03%) 
2025 1.62   (-0.01%) 1.58   (0.01%) 1.98   (-0.03%) 
2026 1.65   (-0.01%) 1.64   (0.01%) 2.06   (-0.03%) 
2027 1.68   (-0.01%) 1.70   (0.01%) 2.15   (-0.03%) 
2028 1.71   (-0.02%) 1.76   (0.01%) 2.23   (-0.03%) 
2029 1.74   (-0.02%) 1.80   (0.01%) 2.30   (-0.03%) 
2030 1.71   (-0.02%) 1.82   (0.01%) 2.33   (-0.03%) 
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Table 7. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels: Case of Coal Share in Scenario 4 
Year Oil  Natural Gas  Coal  
2016 1.18   (-0.01%) 1.10   (-0.01%) 1.20   (0.02%) 
2017 1.25   (-0.01%) 1.14   (-0.01%) 1.28   (0.02%) 
2018 1.32   (-0.01%) 1.19   (-0.01%) 1.37   (0.02%) 
2019 1.37   (-0.01%) 1.24   (-0.01%) 1.46   (0.02%) 
2020 1.42   (-0.01%) 1.30   (-0.01%) 1.55   (0.03%) 
2021 1.47   (-0.01%) 1.35   (-0.01%) 1.64   (0.03%) 
2022 1.51   (-0.01%) 1.41   (-0.01%) 1.73   (0.03%) 
2023 1.55   (-0.01%) 1.46   (-0.01%) 1.81   (0.03%) 
2024 1.58   (-0.01%) 1.52   (-0.01%) 1.90   (0.03%) 
2025 1.62   (-0.01%) 1.58   (-0.01%) 1.98   (0.03%) 
2026 1.65   (-0.02%) 1.64   (-0.01%) 2.06   (0.03%) 
2027 1.68   (-0.02%) 1.70   (-0.01%) 2.15   (0.03%) 
2028 1.71   (-0.02%) 1.76   (-0.01%) 2.23   (0.03%) 
2029 1.74   (-0.02%) 1.80   (-0.01%) 2.30   (0.03%) 
2030 1.71   (-0.02%) 1.82   (-0.01%) 2.33   (0.03%) 
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Table 8. Optimal Carbon Tax Levels: Scenario 5 
Year Oil  Natural Gas  Coal  
2016 1.46  (23.16%) 1.25  (13.42%) 1.49  (24.23%) 
2017 1.64  (30.53%) 1.36  (18.86%) 1.70  (32.57%) 
2018 1.79  (36.09%) 1.48  (24.09%) 1.93  (40.37%) 
2019 1.93  (40.69%) 1.61  (29.22%) 2.15  (47.07%) 
2020 2.06  (44.56%) 1.74  (34.18%) 2.37  (52.89%) 
2021 2.17  (47.86%) 1.88  (38.89%) 2.59  (58.01%) 
2022 2.27  (50.70%) 2.02  (43.35%) 2.81  (62.55%) 
2023 2.37  (53.20%) 2.16  (47.55%) 3.02  (66.61%) 
2024 2.46  (55.40%) 2.31  (51.48%) 3.23  (70.27%) 
2025 2.55  (57.38%) 2.46  (55.18%) 3.44  (73.59%) 
2026 2.63  (59.17%) 2.61  (58.64%) 3.64  (76.63%) 
2027 2.70  (60.81%) 2.76  (61.89%) 3.85  (79.42%) 
2028 2.77  (62.33%) 2.91  (64.95%) 4.06  (82.00%) 
2029 2.86  (64.01%) 3.01  (66.81%) 4.23  (84.07%) 
2030 2.78  (62.56%) 3.04  (67.44%) 4.31  (84.97%) 
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Appendix A. Framework of Macroeconometric Model  
 
This section illustrates the macroeconometric model. We follow Klein’s skeleton model (1983). 
Since this is a conventional model, we do not provide a detailed explanation (Klein, 1983). 
 
Endogenous Variables 
𝑋𝑅𝑡 : Gross domestic product (real) 𝐿𝑡 : Employment 
𝐶𝑅𝑡 : Private final consumption (real) 𝐿𝐹𝑡 : Labor force 
𝐼𝑅𝑡 : Gross fixed capital formation (real) 𝑤𝑡  : Wage rate 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 : Exports (real) 𝑟𝑡 : Interest rate (real) 
𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑡 : Imports (real) 𝑇1,𝑡 : Indirect tax (nominal) 
𝐾𝑅𝑡 : Capital stock (real) 𝑇2,𝑡 : Direct tax (nominal) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 : Depreciation (real) 𝑇3,𝑡 : Corporation profit tax (nominal) 
𝑌𝑡 : National income (nominal) 𝑇𝑟,𝑡 : Transfer payments (nominal) 
𝜋𝑡 : Corporation profit (nominal) 𝑒𝑡 : Exchange rate 
𝑝𝑡  : GDP deflator   
 
Exogenous Variables  
𝐺𝑅𝑡 : Government final consumption (real)  𝑁𝑡 : Population 
𝑊𝑇𝑡  : World trade transactions (real) 𝑝𝑤,𝑡 : World trade price 
𝐼𝑡 : Money supply (nominal) 𝑝𝑚,𝑡 : Import price 
 
Identities  
Real GDP 
𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝐺𝑅𝑡 + 𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑡 (A.1)  
Nominal GDP 
𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + �𝑇1,𝑡 + 𝑇2,𝑡 + 𝑇3,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟,𝑡� − 𝑝𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑡 (A.2)  
National income  
𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + �𝑇2,𝑡 + 𝑇3,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟,𝑡� (A.3)  
Capital stock 
𝐾𝑅𝑡 = 𝐾𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑡 − 𝐷𝑅𝑡 (A.4)  
 
Behavior and Technological Relations 
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Consumption 
𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= 𝑔0 + 𝑔1 � 𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑝𝑡�+ 𝑔2 �𝐶𝑅𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1 � + 𝑢1,𝑡 (A.5)  
Investment 
𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑟𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑢2,𝑡 (A.6)  
Export 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑊𝑇𝑡 + 𝑐2 �𝑝𝑤,𝑡𝑝𝑡 � + 𝑐3𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢3,𝑡 (A.7)  
Import 
 
𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝑑2 � 𝑝𝑡𝑝𝑚,𝑡�+ 𝑑3𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢4,𝑡 (A.8)  
Employment log𝐿𝑡 = 𝑓0 + 𝑓1 log𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝑓2 log𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑓3𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝑢5,𝑡 (A.9)  
Price formation 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑔0 + 𝑔1 �𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡 � + 𝑔2𝑝𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑢6,𝑡 (A.10)  
Wage fate 
𝑤𝑡 = ℎ0 + ℎ1 �𝑋𝑅𝑡𝐿𝑡 � + ℎ2𝑝𝑡 + 𝑢7,𝑡 (A.11)  
Labor force 
𝐿𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= 𝑖0 + 𝑖1 �𝐿𝐹𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡𝐿𝐹𝑡 � + 𝑖2 �𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑡 �+ 𝑢8,𝑡 (A.12)  
Velocity of circulation of money log �𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑡
� = 𝑗0 + 𝑗1𝑟𝑡 + 𝑗2Δ log𝑝𝑡 + 𝑢9,𝑡 
𝑗1 < 0, 𝑗2 > 0 (A.13)  
Depreciation 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 = 𝑘0 + 𝑘1𝐾𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢10,𝑡 (A.14)  
Indirect tax 
𝑇1,𝑡 = 𝑜0 + 𝑜1(𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡) + 𝑢11,𝑡 (A.15)  
Indirect tax 
𝑇2,𝑡 = 𝑚0 + 𝑚1𝑌𝑡 + 𝑢12,𝑡 (A.16)  
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Corporation tax 
𝑇3,𝑡 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢13,𝑡 (A.17)  
Transfer payments  
𝑇𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑜0 + 𝑜1(𝐿𝐹𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡) + 𝑜2𝑤𝑡 + 𝑢14,𝑡 (A.18)  
Exchange Rate  log 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞1 log� 𝑝𝑡𝑝𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑈� + 𝑞2(𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝑟𝑡) − 𝑞3 �𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑡𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡 �+ 𝑢15,𝑡 
𝑞1 > 0, 𝑞2 > 0, 𝑞3 > 0 (A.19)  
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Appendix B. Estimated Results 
 
Macroeconomic Model 
(B.1) Consumption (Real)  
CPR_JPN/POP_JPN=0.7979 * CPR_JPN(-1)/POP_JPN 
(0.1076) 
[0.9154] 
+0.1654 * YD_JPN/(POP_JPN*PGDP10_JPN) 
(2.6043) 
[0.017] 
+8.1234 
           (11.2643)  
           [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.977 S.E.=18.589 D.W.=1.728 
 
(B.2) Investment (Real) 
LOG(IR_JPN)= 0.0047*LOG(RGB_JPN)-1.1145*LOG(GDPR_JPN(-2))+40.736 
      (8.2064)              (-4.4825)       (0.1628) 
       [0.000]               [0.0002]       [0.8723] 
Adj.R2=0.715 S.E.=0.044 D.W.=0.765 
 
(B.3) Export (Real) 
EXR_JPN=11032730*PWT_ALL/PGDP10_JPN+0.4657*WT_ALL+-11059715 
   (-6.3796)       (21.4246)       (2.7604) 
    [0.000]         [0.000]        [0.0114] 
Adj.R2=0.989 S.E.=1792848 D.W.=0.987 
 
(B.4) Import (Real) 
IMR_JPN=0.2141*IMR_JPN(-1) +3666615*PGDP10_JPN/PIM10_JPN 
   (-6.5178)           (7.5696) 
    [0.000]            [0.000] 
+0.4004*GDPR_JPN-140000000 
    (0.8869)         (1.9036)  
    [0.3857]          [0.0715]  
Adj.R2=0.976 S.E.=2040428 D.W.=1.063 
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(B.5) Disposable Income 
YD_JPN=0.918*(GDPR_JPN*PGDP10_JPN-(TAX1_JPN+TAX2_PR_JPN-TR_RP_JPN)-DR_JPN
*PGDP10_JPN) 
(2.6101)  
[0.0177]  
+28048974 
  (31.426) 
   [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.981 S.E.=1566733 D.W.=0.881 
 
(B.6) Depreciation (Real) 
DR_JPN=0.0562*K2R_JPN(-1)+32790732 
    (8.2935)         (16.1472) 
     [0.000]          [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.932 S.E.=1974607 D.W.=0.558 
 
(B.7) Labor Force 
LOG(L_JPN)=0.8459*LOG(L_JPN(-1))-0.1359*LOG(K2R_JPN) 
   (-1.0053)              (6.1276) 
      [0.3297]               [0.000] 
+0.3045*LOG(GDPR_JPN)-1.5377 
      (-6.679)               (8.5147) 
      [0.000]                [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.925 S.E.=0.004 D.W.=2.05 
 
(B.8) Wage Rate 
WAGE_RATE_JPN=4752.457*LOG(PGDP10_JPN)+0.5453*GDPR_JPN/L_JPN-278.0113 
          (-0.4089)                   (6.1719)                 (7.4909) 
           [0.6868]                   [0.000]                  [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.717 S.E.=76.956 D.W.=0.533 
 
(B.9) Capital  
K2R_JPN-K2R_JPN(-1)= 0.6654*IR_JPN-DR_JPN+11463523 
               (3.0955)               (3.7634) 
                [0.0062]              [0.0014] 
Adj.R2=0.409 S.E.=12081209 D.W.=2.417 
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Energy Model  
(B.10) Demand of Final Energy 
LOG(FE_D_ALL_JPN/K2R_JPN)=-0.5998*LOG(PF_JPN(-1)/PK10_JPN(-1))-11.0018 
                       (-29.7322)                          (-10.8877) 
                        [0.000]                             [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.861 S.E.=0.052 D.W.=0.872 
 
(B.11) Demand of Primary Energy  
D1_ALL_JPN=1.4242*FE_D_ALL_JPN+26.4908 
     (0.535)                 (9.4696) 
     [0.598]                 [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.794 S.E.=12.801 D.W.=0.917 
 
(B.12) Price of Final Energy       
PF_JPN=0.012*P1_JPN+639.6767 
  (25.7121)      (13.2719)      
  [0.000]        [0.000]      
Adj.R2=0.884 S.E.=62.797 D.W.=0.36 
 
(B.13) Price of Primary Energy : Crude Oil 
PE1_OIL_JPN=8.2959*_P_OIL_WTI*E_JPN-3832.652 
      (-2.6186)                  (31.7694) 
       [0.0154]                   [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.977 S.E.=3650.467 D.W.=0.492 
 
(B.14) Price of Primary Energy: Natural Gas 
LOG(PE1_GAS_JPN)=0.1526*LOG(_P_GAS_HENRY_HUB*E_JPN) 
            (-0.2177) 
             [0.8296] 
+0.9353*LOG(P1_GAS_JPN(-1))-0.1743 
             (11.4711)                    (2.0765) 
              [0.000]                      [0.0497] 
Adj.R2=0.879 S.E.=0.174 D.W.=1.886 
 
(B.15) Price of Primary Energy : Coal 
LOG(PE1_COL_JPN)=0.9374*LOG(_P_COL_NWE*E_JPN)+0.7977 
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            (0.8658)                          (8.8387) 
             [0.3955]                          [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.763 S.E.=0.199 D.W.=1.076 
 
(B.16) Share of Primary Energy Consumption : Crude Oil 
LOG(S1_OIL_JPN)=0.0056*LOG(P1_GAS_JPN*P1_COL_JPN/P1_OIL_JPN) 
          (-0.503)  
 [0.6202] 
+0.9428*LOG(S1_OIL_JPN(-1))-0.1036 
           (12.8311)                   (0.2219) 
            [0.000]                    [0.8265] 
Adj.R2=0.908 S.E.=0.031 D.W.=2.117 
 
(B.17) Share of Primary Energy Consumption : Natural Gas 
LOG(S1_GAS_JPN)=00.0329*LOG(P1_OIL_JPN*P1_COL_JPN/P1_GAS_JPN) 
           (-0.9671) 
            [0.3445] 
+0.9798*LOG(S1_GAS_JPN(-1))-0.2963 
           (16.9031)                   (1.3832) 
            [0.000]                    [0.1811] 
Adj.R2=0.97 S.E.=0.043 D.W.=2.262 
 
(B.18) Share of Primary Energy Consumption: Coal 
LOG(S1_COL_JPN)=0.0754*LOG(P1_GAS_JPN*P1_OIL_JPN/P1_COL_JPN) 
           (-4.222) 
           [0.0004]  
+0.6553*LOG(S1_COL_JPN(-1))-1.4194 
           (7.2987)                    (4.4528) 
            [0.000]                     [0.0002] 
Adj.R2=0.975 S.E.=0.026 D.W.=2.118 
 
 
 
